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The Power of Speech Acts: Reflections on a
Performative Concept of Ethical Oaths in
Economics and Business
Vincent Blok
Social Sciences Group, Wageningen University, P.O. Box 8130,
6700 EW, Wageningen, The Netherlands
Abstract Ethical oaths for bankers, economists and managers are increasingly
seen as successful instruments to ensure more responsible behaviour. In this article,
we reflect on the nature of ethical oaths. Based on John Austin’s speech act theory
and the work of Emmanuel Levinas, we introduce a performative concept of ethical
oaths that is characterised by (1) the existential self-performative of the one I want to
be, which is (2) demanded by the public context. Because ethical oaths are (3)
structurally threatened by the possibility of infelicity or failure, we stress (4) the
behavioural aspect of ethical oaths in economics and business. We conclude that a
performative concept of ethical oaths can contribute to more ethical behaviour in
economics and business, because the performative involves action and behaviour.
At the same time, it becomes clear that a radical new perspective on the nature,
function and limitation of oaths is needed.
Keywords: professional oath, ethical oath, performative, speech act, Levinas
1. INTRODUCTION
The current economic crisis has revealed that ‘respected’ business models such as
the provision of subprime mortgages to less creditworthy borrowers are not as
ethical as we thought. We are currently aware of the disastrous consequences of
mortgage-backed securities and collaterised debt obligations, and we are well
informed
that the crisis was not a natural disaster, but the result of high risk, complex financial
products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; and the failure of regulators, the credit rating
agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street. (Levin and Coburn
2011)
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Most thoughtful people acknowledge nowadays that we are in need of more
ethical behaviour in economics and business.
Although it is acknowledged that various causes of the economic crisis could
be identified—not only ‘greedy’ bankers but also economic mechanisms and such
a thing as bad luck—especially this unethical behaviour of bankers has caused
social unrest in our society. First of all, a lot of banking managers tried to dodge
their responsibility and accountability for the crisis. Second, the supposed
financial reforms after the crisis, for instance the Dodd–Frank Wall Street reform
and consumer protection act in the USA, seem to have brought about no
improvements at all; there are still just as many or even more derivatives
exposures than before the crisis, just as many or more risky loans, equally lofty
payouts for bank managers as before, etc. It is this apparent continuation of
unethical behaviour of bankers that can be seen as an important driver for the
growing call for more ethical behaviour of bankers, economists and managers in
our society.
Various explanations for this unethical behaviour of bankers can be found in
the literature. From the perspective of modern neurobiological research, for
instance, risky and even greedy behaviour of bankers could be explained by the
higher production of the pleasure neurotransmitter dopamine in situations where
high rewards are expected but uncertain (Sapolsky 2005, cited in Glasser 2011).
And from a philosophical perspective, we could refer to the work of Thomas
Hobbes (1588–1679): greedy behaviour, according to Hobbes, is explained by the
‘right of nature’ that allows people to do and obtain virtually anything one judges
necessary for one’s preservation. The unbounded right of nature can only be
limited by rational ‘laws of nature’; people will not behave ethically without fear
of punishment or retribution by the law. Seen from a Hobbesian perspective,
ethical behaviour can only be enforced by laws or rules that are based on the
rational consent of all people, that is, practical imperatives, which for instance
forbid iniquity and cruel behaviour.
Codes of conduct can be seen as such laws of nature, which are based on the
(rational) consent of the participating parties. A code of conduct is a set of
principles and rules providing a formal framework of responsibilities and proper
actions for an individual or a corporation. They prescribe or proscribe employee or
professional behaviour. Ethical oaths prescribe and proscribe professional
behaviour too, although in a different way. Hobbes, for instance, defined the oath
as ‘a form of speech, added to a promise, by which he that promises signifies that
unless he perform he renounces the mercy of his God, or calls to him for
vengeance on himself’ (Hobbes [1651] 2008: 97). The oath is a self-prescription
that is validated by something that transcends the one who swears (cf. Sulmasy
1999; see Section 3 for further details). Although there are many differences





































between codes of conduct, codes of ethics and professional oaths, they all try to
improve responsible and accountable behaviour of professionals and corporations
through self-regulation. Nowadays, codes of conduct are increasingly seen as
successful instruments to increase ethical behaviour in economics and business, in
general, and responsible behaviour of professionals, in particular (cf. Andersen
and Skjoett-Larsen 2009; Mamic 2005). Recently, calls to introduce professional
oaths for bankers, economists and managers as an instrument to secure more
ethical behaviour have also increased significantly (cf. Anderson and Escher
2010; DeMartino 2011).
An example of such developments is the recent introduction of a Bankers’ oath
in the Netherlands. All employees of Dutch financial institutions have to swear or
promise that they will (1) act with integrity and conscientiously, (2) carefully
consider the interests of stakeholders (clients, shareholders, employees, society,
etc.), (3) prioritise the interests of clients, (4) operate in compliance with the laws,
regulations and codes of conduct and (5) make a sincere effort to preserve and
promote trust in the banking sector (Ministry of Finance 2012).
Does the adoption of ethical oaths or codes of conduct in fact enable us to
enforce more ethical behaviour? Just as formal codes of ethics accepted by over
80% of the publicly traded companies in the USA could not prevent the financial
crisis (DesJardins 2011), so neither does the adoption of an economists’ or
bankers’ oath automatically accomplish more responsible or accountable
behaviour. Various researchers have shown that there is only a weak link
between codes of conduct and corporate behaviour (Cassell et al. 1997; Mathews
1988; Schwartz 2002; Stevens 1994).
From a management perspective, we can also point to the drawbacks of most
codes of conduct; they are often vaguely defined, incomplete, not implemented,
not independently monitored and/or subject to personal bias of senior managers
(Bondy et al. 2007; Dunphy et al. 2007). We can also point to difficulties with the
alignment of different codes of conduct within networks or supply chains,
especially in fields with conflicting interests (Boatright, 2008; Nijhof et al. 2008).
Finally, we can point to the minor role of codes of conduct compared with the
organisational context and culture within which (un)ethical behaviour takes place
(Cassell et al. 1997). It is assumed that similar drawbacks hold for ethical oaths as
well. Can these drawbacks of codes and oaths explain the continuation of
unethical behaviour of bankers after the crisis?
In order to answer the question whether and how ethical oaths can contribute to
the development of more ethical behaviour in economics and business, in this
article we will reflect on the nature of ethical oaths. Elaborating on the work of
Sulmasy (1999), we claim that oaths have to be understood as performative speech
acts, that is, as sentences that do not primarily describe a state of affairs but do or





































perform something. A well-known example is the performative sentence: ‘I name
this ship the Queen Elisabeth’. This sentence does not describe a state of affairs—
the name of the ship—but uttered in an appropriate context, this sentence performs
the naming of the ship. In this article, the performative nature of oaths is not
merely taken as an occasion to determine the nature of ethical oaths in comparison
with promises (Sulmasy 1999). Instead, the characteristics of the performative
will be applied to the concept of the oath in order to develop a model for
performative ethical oaths in economics and business. Our hypothesis is that a
performative concept of ethical oaths can contribute to the development of more
ethical behaviour in economics and business, because the performative essentially
involves action and behaviour. With our discussion of a performative concept of
ethical oaths, however, it will become clear that a radical new perspective on the
nature, function and limitations of oaths in economics and business is needed.
In Section 2, we start our analysis with an introduction of Austin’s concept of
the performative. We distinguish four main characteristics of the performative,
which will be applied to the concept of ethical oaths in Section 3. With this, it will
become clear how a performative concept of ethical oaths has to be understood.
In Section 4, we apply our performative concept of ethical oaths in the domain of
economics and business. In Section 5, we draw some conclusions.
2. JOHN AUSTIN AND THE SPEECH ACT THEORY
The philosopher and founding father of the general theory of speech acts, John
Austin, introduced a distinction between two types of sentences, namely,
constative and performative sentences. His speech act theory explains the ability
of language to do other things with words than providing a mere description of
reality.
In a constative sentence, a state of affairs is described, asserting that something
is the case. The constative sentence—for example, ‘John and Mary are married’—
asserts that John and Marry actually are married. While the primary function of
the constative sentence is to say something and describe a state of affairs, the
performative sentence is primarily a vehicle to do something and create something
new (Austin 1961). If someone utters the sentence ‘I pronounce you man and
wife’, he definitely does not want to describe the marriage ceremony. With this
sentence, he actually performs the marriage. And when John says ‘I do’, he is not
describing his marriage but he is indulging in it.
Originally, Austin thought that the descriptive and performative functions of
sentences were mutually exclusive (Austin 1962). In order to distinguish
accordingly between constative and performative sentences, he first of all claimed
that constative sentences primarily say something, while performative sentences





































do something; the uttering of a performative is, or is part of, the performance of a
certain kind of action (Austin 1962). Austin’s second claim was that contrary to
constative sentences, performatives cannot claim to be true or false. Constative
sentences assert that something is the case and we can test the correctness of this
sentence by assessing whether what is said corresponds with what the world is
like. This is impossible in case of performative sentences such as ‘I name this ship
the Queen Elisabeth’ and ‘I do’. These sentences do not primarily say something
but create something new; the ship as Queen Elisabeth, John as married man.
If this last sentence is uttered alone at home or in a context where no registrar is
present, the sentence ‘I do’ is not false but disabled, unsatisfactory or
inappropriate. Such infelicities, as they are called by Austin, arise if simple rules
are broken. For instance, the sentence ‘I do’ only makes sense if the very
procedure for marrying actually exists and is accepted by both partners.
An infelicity occurs too, if the circumstances in which the sentence ‘I do’ is
uttered are inappropriate. Uttered alone at home or in a context where not the
registrar but the cleaner is present, the act of marrying would not come off. There
are also other ways in which infelicities can arise. Performatives such as ‘I do’
presuppose certain feelings or intentions with regard to my future wife. If I say ‘I
do’ without these feelings and intentions, I am insincere. In this case, we cannot
say that I did not actually marry my wife, but that I married her in an insincere way
(Austin 1961). Although this list of infelicities is not complete and in fact endless
according to Austin (see Section 3 for further details), it becomes clear that
performatives are not truth-evaluable but may be infelicitous.
A third distinction between constatives and performatives is that the latter are
normally stated in the first person singular present indicative active: ‘I do . . . ’,
‘I name . . . ’, ‘I bet . . . ’. For Austin, the first person verb differs importantly from
the use of other persons and other tenses in constative sentences: ‘For when we say
“I promise that . . . ” we do perform an act of promising—we give a promise.What
we do not do is to report on somebody’s performing an act of promising’ (Austin
1961: 242). The third characteristic of the performative is that it is stated in the first
person singular and, therefore, that I am involved in the performative.
Because Austin already saw in an early stage that a strict distinction between
constative and performative sentences is not possible, he later on developed a new
doctrine about the speech act of all types of utterances: the locutionary,
illocutionary and perlocutionary force of sentences.
The locutionary act of a sentence is the act of saying something in a meaningful
and grammatically correct way (Austin 1962), the locutionary act of stating, ‘I like
economics’, for instance. The illocutionary act of a sentence corresponds with the
performative we discussed before. It concerns the act of asserting, questioning,
promising, etc., in a linguistic utterance. But the performance of an illocutionary





































act requires not only the act of a promise or warning by the speaker, but also the
‘securing of uptake’ (Austin 1962) by the one who perceives or hears the sentence;
an illocutionary act such as the sentence ‘shut the door’ will result, if understood
correctly, in someone closing the door. The perlocutionary act concerns this result
of the speech act in the hearer as a result of the speech act.
With this, we encounter a fourth characteristic of the performative.1 The
performative or illocutionary force of a speech act requires that it is understood by
the hearer; I have not sworn an oath in court unless I myself as well as the judges
and the jury members are aware of and understand the oath, that is, the
performative involves the securing of uptake. Furthermore, the performative calls
for ‘conventional consequences’, that is, it involves rights, commitments or
obligations related to it (Austin 1962).
In the following section, we apply the four characteristics of the performative
we distinguished in this section—(1) the involvement of action and behaviour,
including consequences of the performative such as rights and obligations, (2) the
possibility of infelicity, (3) the self-involvement in the performative and (4) the
securing of uptake—to the concept of ethical oaths.
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF A PERFORMATIVE CONCEPT OF
ETHICAL OATHS
If I swear an ethical oath, my utterance takes an ethical stance concerning a state
of affairs—do no harm, for instance—and forces me to commit myself to future
actions according to this oath. The oath has normally four elements: it starts with
an opening formula like the sentence ‘I swear to . . . ’, followed by statements in
which the content of the oath is stated. The oath ends normally with a closing
formula, in which the warranty or binding power of the oath is stated. Also,
gestures and institutional aspects are essential in oath-taking, that is, the actual
wording of the oath, the rituals involved (raising your hand, for instance), the
dignitaries (a registrar or representatives of the profession, for instance), places (in
front of an altar), etc. Although the concept of oaths has unmistakably a religious
background, this binding power can nowadays be embodied by anything that is
important for the one who swears an oath (Rutgers 2013).
In what way does the concept of the performative enable us to characterise and
understand the nature of ethical oaths? Following the work of Austin, Searle
classified different types of performative speech acts such as assertives, directives,
1 Although we acknowledge Austin’s later rejection of a strict distinction between constative and performative
sentences, we think that the concept of the performative is still useful to characterise the typical speech act of
ethical oaths. For this reason, in this article we will continue the use of this concept in order to characterise the
nature of ethical oaths (cf. Briggs 2001; Butler 1997; Sulmasy 1999).





































commissives, expressives and declaratives. Commissives are performative
utterances, in which the speaker commits himself to some future course of action,
such as a promise, oath and pledge (Searle 1969). In a formal way, therefore, we can
already conclude that ethical oaths can be understood as performative or
commissive speech acts.
If we take the opening formula of ethical oaths into account—‘I swear to
. . . ’—we recognise the self-involvement which is also characteristic of the
performative; both ethical oaths and performatives are stated in the first person
singular. The self-involvement in the performative can provide us with a first
characteristic of our performative concept of ethical oaths.
The self-involvement in ethical oaths shows that my utterance of an oath not
only involves my commitment towards a future course of action, but also
primarily involves my self or identity as a person. If I, for instance, answer ‘I do’
as a response to the question ‘do you take this woman to be your lawfully wedded
wife’, I intend not only not to betray my future wife, but also primarily to be the
one who is committed to my lawfully wedded wife. In other words, the utterance
of the oath is primarily a self-performative of the one I want to be, me as husband,
for instance. This means that the self-performative primarily produces my self or
identity as a person, which then has consequences for my lifestyle, attitude and
behaviour towards others (cf. Gorospe 2007). As a married man, I intend, for
instance, not to betray my wife and to take care of her in good and bad times. The
self-performative character of ethical oaths therefore shows that the opening
formula of ethical oaths entails an existential moment, in which it is decided what
type of person I want to be; it concerns primarily my identity as a person and as a
consequence my practical commitment, my attitudes and my feelings (Evens
1963). Therefore, our performative concept of ethical oaths involves the intention
of a person not only to do something, but also to be the one who is committed to
some future course of action.
This self or identity of the swearer is not only involved but also transformed in
swearing an oath. If I, for instance, answer ‘I do’, I am transformed from a man as
single person towards a man as husband. In the same way, does the professional
oath transform a medical student into a medical professional, of whom specific
lifestyles, attitudes or behaviour can be expected. As a self-performative
utterance, the utterance of ethical oaths is an additional step that makes the
medical student a medical professional (cf. Sulmasy 1999). The first characteristic
of our performative concept of ethical oaths is, therefore, that it is an existential
self-performative in which you become the one who you are. It is this self-
performative that is entailed in opening formulas like ‘I swear to . . . ’.
The self-performative character of our concept of ethical oaths raises the
question whether they have to be taken as subjective utterances. Although I am





































involved in the self-performative oath, the meaning of the performative is not,
or at least not completely, dependent on my subjective intentions. Why? From a
formal perspective, there is no subjective referent outside or preceding the
performative; the subject of a medical oath, for instance, is not a physician
because he is not a physician until he utters the oath. The subject of the oath is
neither a layman, because the student already meets all requirements of being a
physician at the moment just before uttering the oath. There is no subjective
referent outside or preceding the performative, because it involves and transforms
myself in becoming the one who I am (cf. Derrida 1982).
Although it is counterintuitive that I am not the subject of ethical oaths, we
have also two other reasons to question the sovereignty of the subject with regard
to ethical oaths. First of all, Baker has shown that oaths and codes develop and
grow in response to historical experiences within a profession. On the basis of
historical material, he has shown that ethical codes evolve through three stages:
initially conduct is regulated by traditions of practice, which are formalised and
rationalised in the second stage by the development of oaths or codes of ethics.
While adherence to these oaths is personal and voluntary in the second stage, they
take on an authoritative status in the third stage, capable of enforcing certain
behaviour (Baker 2005). In this respect, we can understand the current discussion
about the desirability of a Dutch bankers’ oath as a response to the historical
experience of the current economic crisis.
This historical evolvement of oaths and codes shows clearly that they ‘develop
incrementally, out of disparate precursor documents that were formulated for a
variety of purposes as a field grappled with various issues and decided, one-by-
one, how best to deal with them’ (Baker 2005: 34–35). When I utter an ethical
oath, the meaning of this oath is not primarily dependent on my subjective
intentions; it is rather embedded in broader ethical concerns that are historically
determined. Indeed, my utterance of an oath even gets extra weight when it cites
such historically determined concerns; by uttering the Declaration of Geneva as an
expression of my commitment to the humanitarian goals of medicine, for instance,
I place myself in a long and honourable tradition in which the profession of the
physician is embedded. This historical embeddedness of ethical oaths shows that
their meaning is not, or at least not completely, dependent on the subjective
intentions of the one who swears.
A second reason to question the sovereignty of the subject comes up if we
remember that the performative involves the securing of uptake (cf. Section 2). The
self-performative oath operates in a public context, in which it has to be understood
by the public. A self-performative oath that is not stated in a conceivable language is
not an oath at all (Austin 1962). The meaning of the oath is therefore dependent
on the securing of uptake by the public, and this prevents a subjective conception





































of ethical oaths. I can never completely control the way the performative oath
is perceived by others. Rather, the history of ethical oaths can be seen as an
incremental development of performative oaths in response to the ever-changing
environment (technological, cultural, geographical, etc.).
The securing of uptake provides a second characteristic of our performative
concept of ethical oaths. The meaning of the self-performative oath (first
characteristic of our performative concept of ethical oaths) is not dependent on my
subjective intentions, but is determined by the public context (securing of uptake)
and is articulated in the interaction with this public context. This public context is
never completely determinable; incongruency between the oath and actual
behaviour is always possible, since oaths are not univocal and unambiguous (the
citation of an oath in this article is not an oath at all) and can always miss their
mark. In this respect, we can say that the existential self-performative of the one I
want to be is not only determined by the public context, but that this public context
always transcends the one who swears.
The transcendence of the public context can also shed some light on the closing
formula of ethical oaths, in which the warranty or binding power of the oath is
stated. This binding power has to be found precisely in something that transcends
the swearer, as we have seen. On the one hand, it is difficult to refer to one specific
divine warranty for my ethical oath in our multicultural society, if not impossible
in our postmodern age. On the other hand, the public context that determines and
transcends the self-performative oath can be seen as such a highest warranty from
a Levinasian perspective.2
Point of departure of Levinas’ philosophy is the encounter with another person.
The confrontation with another person is completely different from an encounter
with any other object, organism or event in the world. I not only see that another
person looks like me, acts like me and appears to have consciousness like me. For
Levinas, the main difference is that I, in my encounter with another person,
experience myself as the one who is called upon to respond to the other. For
Levinas, the confrontation with the other compels us to perform ethical behaviour.
This calling of another person does not primarily concern my actual ethical
behaviour with respect to other persons in the world. For Levinas, this call
concerns my self, that is, my identity as a person: ‘It involves a calling into
question of oneself, a critical attitude which is itself produced in face of the other
and under his authority’ (Levinas 1969: 81). In my encounter with another person,
I become the one who is responsive to the ‘command’ of the other. At the same
time, the other person appears as the one I am responsive to in my encounter with
2 It should be clear that Levinas himself did not discuss the concept of oaths in relation to ethical behaviour. Degnin
(1997) has tried to connect the development of the Hippocratic Oath with Levinas’ concept of moral life.





































the other. In Levinas’ philosophy, self and other appear as intrinsically interrelated
and mutually co-constitutive; in my encounter with the other, I become the one
who is responsive to the other and the other becomes the one I am responsive to
(cf. Mackin 2011). Human existence is therefore primarily being responsive to the
call of the other, and for Levinas, the most fundamental call is the other’s demand
‘do not kill me’. For Levinas, this fundamental responsiveness to the call of the
other is the origin of language, that is, of our dialogical responsiveness to the
other.
According to Levinas, our responsiveness is traditionally characterised by the
reduction of this other to the same and similar. This not only means that we
normally see another person simply like we see ourselves. In order to understand
the other, we traditionally refrain from his singularity and conceive him in general
terms—the other in his animality, in his rationality, etc. Because the singularity of
the other is understood in general terms, it is precisely this otherness or singularity
of another person that is violated according to Levinas. Contrary to this tradition,
which is rooted in the history of western philosophy, Levinas conceives the other
as irreducible and radically exterior (cf. Levinas 1969), that is, as that which
always transcends our dialogical responsiveness to his call upon us. Contrary to
the philosophical tradition, Levinas develops a way of thinking that is
characterised by a desire for the other without reducing him.3
Just as the public context determines the self-performative oath on the one
hand and transcends the one who swears on the other, does the Levinasian other
determine my self or identity and transcend my responsiveness to him at the same
time. From a Levinasian perspective, therefore, we can conceive the public
context as that which demands the self-performative oath on the one hand and that
which transcends our actual responsiveness to the public context on the other.
In our multicultural or postmodern society, it is precisely this public context that
transcends the one who swears, which can be seen as the binding power and
highest warranty of the self-performative oath; the self-performative is not only
called for by the public context, but also responsive to the public context, that is,
under its command or authority.
Our Levinasian interpretation of the public context enables us to specify the
second characteristic of our performative concept of ethical oaths. The existential
self-performative of the one I want to be (first characteristic of our performative
concept of ethical oaths) is not only determined by the public context (securing of
uptake). The self-performative oath is also demanded by the public context and
this public context is also the highest warranty for my self-performative oath.
3 The further elaboration of Levinas’ philosophy in general and the relation between his concept of dialogue and
Austin’s concept of the performative in particular is beyond the scope of this article.





































In my utterance of the self-performative oath in front of the public context,
I become the one who is responsive to the command of the public context and the
public becomes that to which I am responsive in my self-performative oath.
Thiswarranty, however, does notmean that the success of the oath is guaranteed.
The performative is not truth-evaluable, as we have seen in the previous section. An
example is a medical professional who swears a public oath but does not behave
accordingly. According to Austin, such infelicities occur when any one of six
general rules is broken. These general rules are as follows:
(1) The existence of an accepted procedure, such as the procedure at an
education programme thatmakes themedical student amedical professional.
(2) The circumstances shouldbe appropriate for the invocation of the procedures
involved, for instance, the exact moment of graduation at a university,
witnessed by representatives of the profession.
(3) The procedures must be executed correctly.
(4) The procedures must be executed completely, for instance, the correct and
complete text of a medical oath.
(5) Congruency must exist between the intentions presupposed by the
performative and my actual intentions, for instance, my intention to do no
harm when I utter an oath.
(6) Congruency between the intentions presupposed by the performative andmy
actual behaviour, for instance, advising my patients in their best interest.
The possibility of the infelicity of the performative provides a third characteristic
of our performative concept of ethical oaths. Gestures and institutional aspects such
as procedures and rituals, circumstances and places are essential in oath-taking.
President Obama, for instance, had to retake the oath of office in 2009, because he
flubbed the exact wording of the public ceremony. The exact wording of the oath,
the exact location—a public ceremony in front of the US Capitol and administered
by the SupremeCourt Chief Justice—the exact gestures—raising his right hand and
laying his left hand on the bible—all together guarantee the validity of the oath.
These gestures and institutional aspects can therefore be understood as rules that
have to be followed in order to prevent the infelicity of the self-performative oath.
Obama’s oath of office is only appropriate if all requirements with regard to
location, procedure, wording, etc., are met.
Are these rules conceivable as indispensable (although insufficient) conditions
for the success of the performative in general and the performative concept of
ethical oaths in particular? Conditions (1)–(4) can be understood as conditions of
the public context of ethical oaths. Conditions (5) and (6) can guarantee ethical
behaviour, because they enforce congruency between ethical intentions and
ethical behaviour. If this is the case, we can claim that a self-performative and





































publicly stated oath that meets these six conditions or rules is able to guarantee
ethical behaviour. The self-performative oath then implies ethical action and the
six conditions guarantee the congruency between our judgement and our ethical
behaviour in general and the trustworthiness and integrity of our behaviour in
particular.
Nevertheless, Austin is quite ambiguous in his assessment of these conditions,
as Derrida (1982) pointed out. On the one hand, he seems to admit that the
possibility of infelicity is a structural characteristic of the performative, which can
never be avoided completely (Austin 1962). On the other hand, this structural risk
of failure is not seen as an essential characteristic of the performative, but as ‘an
accidental, exterior one that teaches us nothing about the language phenomenon
under consideration’ (Derrida 1982: 323–324). Austin hopes to avoid the
structural risk of failure of the performative by invoking the use of ‘ordinary
language’ and ‘ordinary circumstances’ (1962). But if the possibility of infelicity
is a structural possibility of a performative utterance, then the possibility of
infelicity is always there. And if the possibility of infelicity is granted, the risk of
failure is not an accident but a structural condition of any oath. The third
characteristic of our performative concept of ethical oaths is, therefore, that the six
rules are an indispensable condition for the self-performative oath—an oath
should entail instructions with regard to procedures and institutional aspects—
although they are insufficient to guarantee ethical behaviour; a performative
concept of ethical oaths acknowledges that they are structurally threatened by the
possibility of failure.
Is it necessary to draw such a negative conclusion about the fallibility of ethical
oaths? Austin himself already stated that ethical speech acts are exposed to
infelicity (1962), and various authors after him have also pointed to these
fundamental risks of failure of ethical oaths (Dienhart 1995). This infelicity is
obvious in the case of a banker who claims to act in the best interest of his
customers but treats them like ‘Muppets’ or manipulates interest rates; he is faking
or cheating and therefore performs an infelicity. But we do not have to conceive
this faking merely at an individual level of bankers, economists or top managers,
although this kind of behaviour caused the greater part of the social unrest during
the economic crisis.
DeMartino has pointed to our epistemic insufficiency with regard to complex
fields of study such as medicine and economics. Not only is our knowledge of
economic interventions in order to improve economic development limited, but
also it is acknowledged that all economic theories are insufficient (cf. Hofmann
2001). The economic crisis made clear that economics is a highly complex field of
study and that the consequences of economic policies are unpredictable. In other
words, our knowledge is principally insufficient to predict the future and there will





































always be unintended consequences of our economic interventions, which can be
harmful (DeMartino 2013). In an ever-changing environment, we could say that
the possibility of the infelicity is structural.
Negatively speaking, this leads to a relativistic position that suggests that we
can question the trustworthiness and integrity of all ethical oaths because of their
structural infelicity. We can, however, also take this infelicity in a positive way:
the history of ethical oaths can be seen as a history of their infelicity, which
inspired the incremental development of these oaths in response to the ever-
changing environment. In this respect, there is no difference between the
adjustments of medical oaths because of new legislation with regard to abortion,
for instance, and the introduction of a bankers’ oath in response to the economic
crisis.
But still, does such a positive assessment of the infelicity of ethical oaths not
lead to a relativistic position with regard to ethical issues? How can we ever
distinguish between ethical and unethical behaviour, if all performatives are
characterised by this structural possibility of infelicity? Although we cannot and
will not deny the structural possibility of the infelicity of ethical oaths (third
characteristic of our performative concept of ethical oaths), we still think that the
performative provides a way to distinguish between ethical and unethical
behaviour. To see this, we return to the three characteristics of our performative
concept of ethical oaths we have discussed till now.
Our performative concept of ethical oaths is first of all characterised by the
self-performative of my identity or the one I want to be, as we have seen. This self-
performative oath is demanded by the public context and is the highest warranty of
our ethical oath (second characteristic of our performative concept of ethical
oaths). The structural possibility of the infelicity of ethical oaths (third
characteristic of our performative concept of ethical oaths) made clear that the
infelicity primarily concerns my self or identity. Austin distinguished between two
specific types of infelicity with regard to my identity. The self-performative oath
is infelicitous, if there is incongruency between my performative utterance and my
actual intentions, that is, the one I want to be, or between the one I want to be and
my actual behaviour.
My actual behaviour is, however, not the result of the ethical oath I have
uttered, because the self-performative of my identity already implies and is some
kind of action and has already behavioural consequences such as rights and
obligations (cf. Section 2); to swear an oath is to declare something about my
future actions and behaviour, but my actual commitment to the oath only shows
itself in my actual behaviour in accordance with the oath in general and with the
rights and obligations involved in particular. Because the performative already
involves some kind of action, the production of my ‘self’ by the self-performative





































oath is already accompanied by a second production of myself as acting and living
in the light of the oath.
With regard to my actual behaviour, there are two possibilities. Either I am able
to live up to the self-performative oath, or I fail because I am not able or even not
willing to live up to it. The only touchstone I have for the performative oath is the
question whether the oath is really able to determine and mark my identity and my
behaviour accordingly. This either/or shows that the second production cannot be
seen as an accident or mere result of the first production—the self-performative of
my identity—but is essential for our performative concept of ethical oaths. Why?
Because of the structural risk of infelicity or failure, I only live up to the oath by
my actual acting in the light of the oath; only by living and acting in the light of the
oath does my self-performative of the oath become real. This means that our
actual behaviour enables us to testwhether the one who swears actually lives up to
the standard to which he has sworn.
The ethical testability of my actual ethical behaviour, which is implied in the
self-performative oath, can shed some light on the content of the oath. The content
of the ethical oath has to be understood as the behavioural consequences—rights
and obligations—of the self-performative of my identity. The fourth characteristic
of our performative concept of ethical oaths is, therefore, that the self-
performative is not restricted to my intention to commit myself to some future
action—as most traditional conceptions of ethical oaths seem to claim (cf.
Sulmasy 1999)—but involves my actual behaviour according to the rights and
obligations that are stated in the content of the oath. My actual ethical behaviour
according to the rights and obligations is the only touchstone I have to distinguish
between ethical and unethical behaviour.
Can we claim, then, that the one who is able to live up to the oath by his acting
in the light of the oath in fact performs ethical behaviour? Because of the
structural infelicity of every oath, my living up to the oath consists not only in my
actual acting in the light of the oath, but also in the incessant appropriation and re-
appropriation of the oath in my struggle against its possible infelicity.
We can understand the necessity of the incessant appropriation from the
Levinasian perspective we developed earlier in this section. We have seen that the
confrontation with the other primarily concerns my self or my identity as a person.
This involves ‘a calling into question of my self’—that is, of my current living and
acting according to the content of the oath (cf. Levinas 1969)—under the authority
of the public context. According to Levinas, the ultimate meaning of knowledge is
precisely to put oneself into question in the presence of the other: ‘The essence of
reason consists not in securing for man a foundation and powers, but in calling
him in question and in inviting him to justice’ (Levinas 1969: 88). From a
Levinasian perspective, therefore, my responsibility consists not only in my actual





































living and acting according to the content of the oath I have sworn, but also in
putting my actual behaviour into question. My appropriation and re-appropriation
of the ethical oath does not want to avoid the possibility of infelicity, as Austin
does, but sees the possibility of infelicity precisely as a driver to produce my
actual living and acting in the light of the oath, that is, to produce ethical
behaviour.
In the following section, we apply our performative concept of ethical oaths in
the domain of economics and business.
4. TOWARDS A PERFORMATIVE CONCEPT OF ETHICAL OATHS
IN ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS
In Section 3, we distinguished four characteristics of our performative concept of
ethical oaths. What are the consequences of this concept for professional oaths in
economics and business?
We have seen that the oath normally starts with an opening formula, which is
stated in the first person singular. An example is the opening formula of the Dutch
Bankers Oath: ‘I declare that I will act as banker with integrity and
conscientiously’. Our performative concept of ethical oaths made clear that the
oath primarily concerns the identity or personhood of the one who swears; the
performative oath involves not only the intentions of a person to commit himself
to some future course of action, but also the self or identity of the one who is
committed to ethical behaviour. This existential moment of the ethical oath,
in which a new employee of a bank or another corporation becomes a member of a
professional community of bankers, economists or managers, should be stressed
in an economist’s or manager’s oath. As a consequence, the introduction of
professional oaths in economics and business should be accompanied by policies
that enable reflection on what it means to be an economist or a manager, what are
the causes of unethical behaviour and how to establish ethical behaviour in
economics and business (cf. Anderson and Escher 2010). These opportunities for
reflection could be provided by education programmes, but also by professional
associations and companies, for instance.
The emphasis on this existential moment is particularly important if we take
the criticism of universal ethical principles and norms into account. According to
this criticism, there are no universally accepted principles or norms that I can
commit myself to; the universal principles I commit myself to are in fact relative
to cultural or social differences. But if we stress the existential moment of the self-
performative in our concept of ethical oaths, we stress precisely the relativity of
the oath to my identity or personhood; it concernsmy lifestyle,my attitudes andmy
behaviour. Not the universal validity of the content of the oath is embraced in the





































performative oath —the history of ethical oaths can be seen as an incremental
development of oaths in response to the ever-changing environment in general and
the infelicity of the oath in particular—but the existential decision to live and act
in the light of the oath, here and now.
There is also another advantage of stressing the existential moment in the self-
performative oath in economics and business. Based on the work of Hopwood,
Cassell et al. (1997) have shown that the internalisation of corporate codes of
ethics by individual recipients of these codes will have a positive impact on their
individual behaviour. In order to have a positive impact on individual behaviour,
these principles or norms should be ‘either directly or indirectly... internalised by
the members of the enterprise and operate as personal controls over attitudes and
behaviour’ (Hopwood 1974: 31). We may assume that the internalisation of
ethical oaths—which is stressed in our performative concept of ethical oaths—
will have a similar positive impact on our individual ethical behaviour in the light
of the oath.
The opening formula of the oath is normally followed by statements in which
the content of the oath is stated. An example is the content of the Dutch Bankers
Oath:
When considering these interests [of all stakeholders of the bank], I will prioritise the
interests of clients and will inform them to my best ability. I will operate in compliance
with the laws, regulations and codes of conduct that are applicable to me as a banker.
I will keep confidential what is entrusted to me. I will not abuse my knowledge as banker
(Netherlands Banking Association 2010).
Normally, it is argued that these statements should be characterised by clarity,
comprehensiveness and enforceability in order to be effective (Raiborn and Payne
1990). On the one hand, a claire et distincte (clear and distinct) formulation of the
content of a bankers’ oath could indeed prevent the ambiguity of its content and
provide guidelines on how to proceed in cases of conflicts of interest. On the other
hand, the improvement of the clarity and comprehensiveness of its content does
not prevent the possible infelicity of ethical oaths (third characteristic of our
performative concept of ethical oaths). Contrary to legalistic or instrumental
approaches of the content of ethical oaths, in which the content is stated in terms
of moral do’s and don’ts, we have stressed the importance of actual behaviour in
the light of the oath and in accordance with the rights and obligations involved.
The possible infelicity of all performatives, however, has made clear that the self-
performative of swearing is a necessary but insufficient condition for our
performance of ethical behaviour. Only by living and acting in the light of the oath
is our self-performative of the oath real.





































At the same time, our living and acting in the light of the oath is insufficient to
perform ethical behaviour. We have to acknowledge our epistemic insufficiency
with regard to complex fields of study such as economics and business. The
fundamental uncertainty and high risk in business planning and policy-making
and the potential harm these businesses can cause for others—customers,
employees, civil society, future generations, etc. (DeMartino 2011)—compel us to
be prudent with regard to the (universal) validity of the content of ethical oaths.
Our ethical behaviour in economics and business consists not only in our living
and acting in the light of the oath, but also in the incessant recapturing of its
content in our struggle against its possible infelicity as well.
How can we operationalise our epistemic insufficiency with regard to
economics and business? Ethical oaths in economics and business should embrace
a prudential principle. Because of the complexity, uncertainty and high risk in
fields such as economics and business, individual professionals and corporations
should take these uncertainties into account in their business planning and policy-
making, resulting in more moderate and safer business strategies. Furthermore,
the acknowledgement of our epistemic insufficiency should lead to more caution
in our business activities in high-risk markets. This modesty will not solve the
problem of uncertainty and high risk, but enables economics and business to
‘manage ethically but imperfectly a problem that cannot be eradicated’ (DeMartino
2011: 187–188).
When we stress the possibility of infelicity, failure or even insufficiency in our
performative concept of ethical oaths, three things become clear. First of all, the
infelicity shows that it is insufficient to utter an oath once and for all at the moment
of graduation or appointment. In one way or another, we have to repeat and
re-appropriate the self-performative oath again and again by dedicating ourselves
continuously to its content. Policies that enable the reflection on ethical issues
we mentioned before could help to appropriate and re-appropriate the ethical
oath within the context of companies and professional associations. The
re-appropriation of the oath is, however, not only an individual affair. The
meaning of the self-performative oath is not dependent on my subjective
intentions but is articulated in the interaction between the one who swears and the
public context (cf. Section 3). As a consequence, the re-appropriation of the
performative oath cannot be seen as the repetition of the statement of one’s
personal belief, but as a dynamic product of an ongoing conversation (and
negotiation) with the public context. Professional associations in economics and
business should therefore communicate with the public context on a structural
basis, in order to assess the applicability of the content of the oath in an ever-
changing environment and to re-appropriate its content. If the conversations and





































negotiations lead to the reformulation of the content of the oath, then professionals
can in principle be asked to repeat the re-appropriated oath in front of the public.
Second, our epistemic insufficiency with regard to economics and business
shows that the incessant re-appropriation of the performative oath in front of the
public is insufficient and should include our embracement of a prudential principle.
In order to embrace this prudency principle, economists and managers should
develop specific competencies with regard to critical reflection, the ability of
learning and the management of the so-called ‘wicked’ problems. One of the main
characteristics of wicked problems is that multiple stakeholders are involved with
different interests and values (Batie 2008; Rittel and Webber 1973). Both in
education programmes and in professional life, knowledge, attitudes and skills with
regard to learning, reflection and dealing with the interest of multiple stakeholders
should be stimulated and facilitated by policies, governance structures, etc.
The development of these abilities cannot remove the criticism that the interests
of multiple stakeholders can conflict with each other. On the one hand, these
possible conflicts are acknowledged and mitigated by the embracement of the
prudency principle and by the ability of economists and managers to deal with
multiple stakeholders. On the other hand, we have to accept the fundamental
possibility of the infelicity of ethical oaths in economics and business.
Third, the fundamental possibility of the infelicity of ethical oaths makes it
clear that the sole introduction of ethical oaths in economics and business is not
sufficient. It should be accompanied by the introduction of formal and informal
control systems. These control mechanisms enable the monitoring and evaluation
of ethical behaviour in accordance with the oath within organisations and/or
professional communities. In addition to the personal self-control, which is at
stake in the self-performative oath, we can think of formal controls such as rules
and procedures and informal controls such as common customs and values in
professional life (cf. Cassell et al. 1997). The introduction of formal and informal
controls at company level enhances ethical behaviour not only of individual
employees, but also at corporate level.
Are the gestures and the institutional aspects, which are essential in oath-taking
also helpful in reducing this possibility of infelicity? Boatright has pointed to the
importance of institutional design to ensure ethical behaviour (2011). Institutional
design concerns the governance structure, the separation of functions, etc., in
which professional behaviour of economists and managers is normally embedded;
professionals have specific roles and responsibilities and decision-making follows
certain procedures, for instance. We can conceive these institutional aspects as the
gestures involved in the performative oath; the existence of accepted procedures,
circumstances for the invocation of the procedures, the correct execution of the
procedures, etc. (Section 3), are an integral part of the performative oath, which





































ensures ethical behaviour. As a consequence, the introduction of the performative
oath should be embedded in the institutional design of financial institutions and
corporations. The embeddedness of individual behaviour of economists and
managers in the institutional design ensures more responsible behaviour not only
at the individual level, but also at the corporate level of institutions.
The emphasis on the importance of institutional design as an integral part of the
self-performative oath has an important advantage. It is argued that unethical
behaviour of managers is not due to individual moral deficiencies. Jackall (1988),
for instance, argues that the bureaucratic structures of modern organisations
encourage unethical behaviour of managers. Although we stressed the existential
moment in the self-performative oath, the performance of ethical behaviour
should be facilitated by these gestures embedded in the organisation design.
Ethical oaths normally end with a closing formula, in which the warranty or
binding power of the oath is stated: ‘So help me God almighty’ or ‘this I affirm and
promise’. In our multicultural or postmodern society, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to refer to one divine warranty for our ethical oaths. Our Levinasian
interpretation of the public context has enabled us to conceive the performative
oath as demanded by the public context and under its authority. This demand
character of the public context—customers, civil society, future generations,
etc.—should be stressed if we introduce the performative oath in economics and
business. On the one hand, it is precisely this public context that is the highest
warranty for our self-performative oath in our postmodern society. On the other
hand, it has become clear that the utterance of the closing formula of ethical oaths
is in itself insufficient to guarantee ethical behaviour.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We started this article with the current economic crisis and the societal concerns
about the ethical behaviour of economists and managers in our society. Although
we acknowledged that there are various causes of the economic crisis, we raised
the question whether and how ethical oaths can contribute to the development of
more ethical behaviour in economics and business.
Although we admit that there are various means to ensure ethical behaviour of
individuals, we conclude that a performative concept of ethical oaths can
contribute to the development of more ethical behaviour because performative
oaths essentially involve action and behaviour. At the same time, we have seen
that our perspective on the nature, function and limitation of ethical oaths has to
change. Our performative concept of ethical oaths consists precisely (1) in the
self-performative of the one I want to be, (2) which is demanded by the public
context as the highest warranty for the self-performative oath. (3) Because of the





































structural possibility of infelicity of ethical oaths does my (4) living up to my oath
consist not only in my actual living and acting in the light of the oath, but also in
the incessant recapturing of the oath in my struggle against its possible infelicity.
The introduction of ethical oaths in economics and business requires much
more than an intentional statement about future actions and behaviour. (1) The
self-performative character of ethical oaths requires policies that enable the
reflection of professionals on ethical issues in education programmes, companies
and professional associations. These policies will increase the self-involvement
and internalisation of ethical oaths. (2) Because ethical oaths are the product of an
ongoing conversation with the public context, employees, companies and
professional associations should engage in communication with the public context
on a structural basis; these conversations help to assess the clarity of the content of
ethical oaths and its applicability in an ever-changing environment, and to enable
the re-appropriation of its content if necessary. Furthermore, because of the
complexity of fields of study such as economics and business, in which multiple
stakeholders with different interests and value frames are involved, professionals
in economics and business should be trained in learning, reflection and dealing
with multiple stakeholders. (3) Because of the structural possibility of infelicity,
the introduction of ethical oaths in economics and business should be accompanied
by formal and informal control systems,which enable themonitoring and evaluation
of ethical behaviour in accordance with the oath. (4) The self-performative oath
should therefore be embedded within the organisational design of corporations.
Just as ethical oaths cannot be seen as a panacea for solving the economic
crisis, these additional requirements cannot entirely prevent unethical behaviour
of professionals. Nevertheless, the introduction of a performative concept of
ethical oaths as described in this article can contribute to more ethical behaviour
by individual professionals and corporate institutions in particular.
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